When may a wallet's key attestation claim an iso_18045 key_storage level?
Key attestation levels assert ISO 18045 attack resistanceOID4VCI 1.0 §Appendix D.2MUSTRoles: wallet
Requirement as recorded in the ProtocolSoup registry
This specification defines the following values for key_storage and user_authentication: iso_18045_high: It MUST be used when key storage or user authentication is resistant to attack with attack potential "High", equivalent to VAN.5 according to [ISO.18045]. iso_18045_moderate: It MUST be used when key storage or user authentication is resistant to attack with attack potential "Moderate", equivalent to VAN.4 according to [ISO.18045]. iso_18045_enhanced-basic: It MUST be used when key storage or user authentication is resistant to attack with attack potential "Enhanced-Basic", equivalent to VAN.3 according to [ISO.18045]. iso_18045_basic: It MUST be used when key storage or user authentication is resistant to attack with attack potential "Basic", equivalent to VAN.2 according to [ISO.18045].
Read §Appendix D.2 in OID4VCI 1.0Self-test verdict
PassCommit 49e2a4fEvaluated
This is ProtocolSoup's result against its own implementation at the commit shown. It is not a certification of ProtocolSoup or of any other product.
Captured from production
Not captured for this build.
Tests
- TestRefuseUnbackedKeyAttestationLevels
./cmd/walletharness
Pass - TestHAIPBatchProofsShareSingleKeyAttestation
./cmd/walletharness
Pass
Implementation
Explainer
What this requires
OpenID4VCI 1.0 Appendix D.2 defines the values a key attestation may put in key_storage and user_authentication. Each is tied to a measured result: iso_18045_high "MUST be used when key storage or user authentication is resistant to attack with attack potential "High", equivalent to VAN.5 according to [ISO.18045]", and the same form holds for iso_18045_moderate (VAN.4), iso_18045_enhanced-basic (VAN.3) and iso_18045_basic (VAN.2). The value is the claim; the vulnerability analysis is what backs it. A wallet whose keys live in ordinary process memory or on disk has had no such analysis and so has no value it may use.
Why it exists
An Issuer reads these values to decide whether a holder key is protected the way its policy demands before it binds a credential to that key. The decision is only as good as the claim. A software wallet that writes iso_18045_moderate into its attestation passes an Issuer's key_attestations_required check that exists to exclude it, and the credential ends up bound to a key with weaker protection than the Issuer accepted.
What non-compliance looks like
The wallet hard-codes "key_storage":["iso_18045_moderate"] so it always meets an Issuer's threshold, whatever key storage it actually uses. Or, asked by a configuration's key_attestations_required for iso_18045_high, it claims the level rather than stop.
How ProtocolSoup tests it
The hosted wallet's key attestation carries neither key_storage nor user_authentication. Its keys are software keys that have had no ISO/IEC 18045 vulnerability analysis, so there is no level it can back, and no setting makes it claim one. When a configuration's key_attestations_required names key_storage or user_authentication values, refuseUnbackedKeyAttestationLevels stops issuance before the Token Request with a 400 that names the demanded levels.
TestRefuseUnbackedKeyAttestationLevels asserts that an empty key_attestations_required is accepted and that a demand for a key_storage or user_authentication level is refused with a 400 naming it. TestHAIPBatchProofsShareSingleKeyAttestation builds the key attestation for a batch request and asserts it carries neither claim. ProtocolSoup's own HAIP mDL configuration asks for no level: it publishes key_attestations_required as an empty object, which OpenID4VCI 1.0 Section 12.2.4 describes as "indicating a key attestation is needed without additional constraints". The captured failing exchange points the wallet at the conformance counterparty's cw-101 issuer, whose configuration demands iso_18045_high, and shows the wallet refusing before any Token Request.